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STUDENT NOTES
DEAD BODIES-RIGHT OF SURVIVMxG SPOUSE AS AGAINST HUSBAnD'S
PAXENTS.
The plaintiff allowed her deceased husband's parents to select a
burial place, pay all expenses of interment and two years later petitioned a court of equity to allow her to remove her husband's body to
a cemetery more convenient to her own home. The court overruled
all the objections of the parents and granted her plea on the ground
that the next of kin has the absolute right to select a place of burial
even though the body has long been laid to rest. Blake v. Mother of
God's Cemetery, 251 Ky. 667, 56 S. W. (2d) -739 (1933). The defendants also raised -an objection based on estoppel. This objection was met
by the court's showing that the acquiescence of the wife must be shown
by clear and uncontradictory evidence, and that this was not done
as she gave her consent immediately after the death of her husband
at a time when she was laboring under great mental strain. McMillan v. Gentry, 96 Okla. 235, 221 Pac. 717 (1923); McEntee v. Bonacum, 66 Neb. 651, 92 N. W. 633 (1902); In the Matter of Richardson,
29 Misc. 367, 60 N. Y. S. 539 (1899).
Many jurisdictions limit the right of the wife to remove the body
after it has once been buried while recognizing her undoubted right
to select a burial place in the first instance. In Curlin v. CurZin, 228
S. W. 602 (1921), the court said: "We realize and admit the fact that
this defendant could have selected a place to bury her husband, but
she now has no such right where she has consented to the original
place of burial as a final resting place and no cogent reasons are shown
for its removal." The court held the mother and father and brother
of deceased could enjoin the wife from interfering with the remains.
New York appears to follow the decision of Curlin v. Curlin,
supra, and in the late case of Yome v. Gorman, 242 N. Y. 395, 152 N. E.
126 (1926), the court said: "The 'wishes of the surviving spouse are
not supreme and final when the body has been laid to rest and the
aid of equity is invoked to disturb the quiet of the grave; but in
such a case there will be due regard to the interests of the public, the
wishes of decedent, and the rights and feelings of those entitled to
be heard by reason of relationship or association." In Stiles v. Stiles,
113 Misc. 576, 185 N. Y. S. 53 (1920), a widow-was denied the right
to remove her husband's remains where her primary right to control
was held to have been waived by her acquiescence to the burial in the
cemetery lot of the plaintiff, the deceased's father, under promises by
him to provide room on the lot for the interment of the other members of the deceased's family.
Other jurisdictions are still more strict in allowing removal of the
body after it is once buried. Litteral v. idtteral, 131 Mo. App. 306, 111
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S. W. 872 (1908). The court enjoined removal by the widow of her
husband's remains from the place where buried by the father, in whose
home the son died during the wife's absence, although she was ignorant of the death and unable to assert her right to select a place of
burial because of the father's neglect to notify her. The court held
a widow has not an absolute right afterwards to disinter the body from
the place where buried in a proper manner by the next of kin for the
purpose merely of removal to a place more to her liking. This decision is closely followed in Boyce v. Kalbaugh, 47 Md. 334, 28 Am. Rep.
464 (1877); Chew V. First Tresby. Church, 237 Fed. 219 (1916); Bitter
v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 76 S. E. 428 (1912).
In Rhode Island the courts appear inclined to follow Kentucky
although but one case directly in point was found. Hackett v. Hackett,
Here it was held that a widow
18 R. I. 155, 26 Atl. 42 (1893).
has an absolute right to remove the body of her husband from its place
of original sepulture without consent of the next of kin. A note in 7
Harv. L. Rev. 123, in commenting on this case says the decision is
undoubtedly correct.
Generally it may be said that there is no property right in a dead
body in the commercial sense, but there is a right to bury it which the
law recognizes and protects. This right in the absence of testamentary
declaration rests in the next of kin. Most of the adjudged cases in
this country are to the effect that the husband has the right of preference as to the place of -burial of his wife's body and the wife has a
like right as to the husband's remains. Neighbor's v. Neighbors, 112
Ky. 161, 65 S. W. 607 (1901). The clash in the decisions comes after
the body has once been buried. Most courts seem to feel that there
is a certain sanctity in the grave which is paramount to any previous
rights owned by the dead person's closest of kin. Just as an injunction
may be had by the relatives to restrain unlawful removal or desecration of the grave by aliens, so will an injunction be issued by the
court to prevent removal by the relative, unless some unfisual situation has arisen which overrides their natural compunction to such

an act.
Kentucky and a very few other jurisdictions are inclined to the
opposite view and believe the rights of the husband or wife are absolutely paramount to everything else and that they may not only
select the original place of burial but may afterwards remove the body
even though they have previously consented to the first resting place.
This position is not so radical when we realize that the husband or
the wife is first in the affections of the other spouse and that it must
be the wife or the husband who will presumably suffer the greatest
sorrow from the death of his or her loved one. This is one of the
reasons given by the court for its decision in Blake v. Mother of God's
Cemetery, supra, and in treipe V. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 Ky. 15,
47 S. W. (2d) 1004 (1932).
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